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This study examined the adoption of security practices, with the goal of identifying dominant configurations and 
their relationship to perceived compliance. We utilized survey data from 204 hospitals including adoption status of 
17 security practices and perceived compliance levels on HITECH, HIPAA, Red Flags Rules, CMS, and State laws 
governing patient information security. Using cluster analysis and t-tests, we found that three clusters of security 
practices are significantly associated with different levels of perceived compliance. We demonstrated significant 
differences among non-technical practices rather than technical practices, and the highest levels of compliance are 
associated with hospitals that employed a balanced approach between technical and non-technical practices (or 
between one-time and cultural practices). Our results provide security practice benchmarks for healthcare 
administrators and can help policy makers in developing strategic and practical guidelines for practice adoption. 
Keywords  
Security Practices, Compliance, Healthcare, Regulation. 
INTRODUCTION 
Growing concern over protected healthcare information security in the U.S. has led to increased regulation and 
changes in the required security practices needed to achieve compliance. However, some surveys by both industry 
groups and the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) noted wide disparity both in security practices 
and in perceived compliance with federal (HITECH/HIPAA) and state regulations (HHS 2005; Pavolotsky 2011). It 
is not surprising that hospital practices vary, given the heterogeneity of federal and state regulation. However, low 
levels of perceived compliance indicate that managers are uncertain about their own practices and the required path 
to compliance.  
Given the variety of security practices that hospitals can implement, how do managers make strategic 
implementation choices? How are different sets of security practices associated with perceived regulatory 
compliance? Although recent research has paid attention to the organizational and the socio-technical aspects of 
security management (Johnston and Warkentin 2010; Kayworth and Whitten 2010), there is a dearth of empirical 
literature that considers the relationship between the configuration of security practices and perceived compliance. 
This paper represents one effort at addressing this void in the informatics literature by providing a snapshot of 
security practices and regulatory compliance.  
Through our analysis using clustering and then comparing those clusters via t-tests, we identified three clusters of 
security practices that are associated with different levels of perceived regulatory compliance. Although high 
practice adoption, across the board, was generally associated with high compliance, our analysis revealed patterns of 
practice and compliance. We found that audit practices were important to those who scored in the middle of the pack 
on compliance. However, hospitals in the highest cluster of compliance were also significantly managing third-party 
breaches and training. Our results provide security practice benchmarks for healthcare administrators and can help 
policy makers in developing strategic and practical guidelines for practice adoption.  
                                                           
*
 This research was partially supported by the National Science Foundation, Grant Award Number CNS-0910842, under the 
auspices of the Institute for Security, Technology, and Society (ISTS) 
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The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides research background on security and 
compliance from prior literature. Then, we describe our data and the research methods followed by the results. The 
paper concludes with a discussion of our findings and their implications for practice and future research. 
BACKGROUND 
Security practices include management processes for detecting and mitigating risks as well as the implementation of 
technical safeguards (ITGI 2005; D'Arcy et al. 2009). Unfortunately, many healthcare organizations follow a 
reactive path of implementing technical stopgaps because information security has been perceived to be largely a 
technical issue—independent from the business of providing care (Urbaczewski and Jessup 2002; Murphy et al. 
2011). However, that view is beginning to shift towards a more holistic socio-technical perspective on information 
security, emphasizing the importance of integrating technical solutions with organizational security culture, policies, 
and education (Collmann and Cooper 2007; Puhakainen and Siponen 2010; Siponen and Vance 2010). A socio-
technical perspective relies on many of the same underlying mechanisms as societal laws: providing knowledge 
(through education) of what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable conduct to increase the efficiency of an 
organization’s security activities (Herath and Rao 2009). 
Given the heterogeneity of security practices, researchers and practitioners have called for organizations to be more 
strategic in their approach to information security—yet it has not always been clear what such an approach looks 
like in practice (Johnston and Warkentin 2010; Kayworth and Whitten 2010; Spears and Barki 2010). Organizations 
are faced with a dynamic information security environment characterized by constantly changing risks and legal 
compliance issues (Beard et al. 2012).
 
Within this environment, healthcare organizations must develop a security 
strategy that both ensures compliance as well as protects patient information. Organizations that achieve this 
objective will have a highly effective information security strategy. However, many have emphasized simple 
checklists of technical components rather than striving to deploy strategic solutions (Puhakainen and Siponen 2010). 
Therefore, this study attempts to provide better strategic implementation choices for hospitals by identifying the 
relationship between security practices and regulatory compliance. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Data Source and Sampling 
We utilized data from the Kroll/HIMMS
†
 hospital survey, which was designed to examine effective patient data 
security practices and management measures. The survey data includes responses from 250 hospitals, including 
adoption of 17 different security practices (1 if adopted, 0 otherwise) and perceived levels of regulatory compliance 
for HITECH, Red Flag Rules, HIPAA, State laws, and CMS regulations (measured on a seven-point scale where 1 is 
“not at all compliant” and 7 is “compliant with all applicable standards”). We also included organizational variables, 
which are commonly used in health economics to control for the size and type of organization.  In our model, size is 
the number of licensed beds (measured on a three-point scale where 1 is under 100 beds, 2 is 100 to 299 beds, and 3 
is 300 beds or more) and critical access, general medical, and academic are all (exclusive) dummy variables that 
describe the hospital type. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables in our analysis.  
Among the 250 observations, 46 hospitals were dropped because of missing data, and thus our final sample included 
204 hospitals. Our analysis considered the relationship between individual security practices and compliance, 
categorizing practices into those that involve safeguarding information, auditing, HR management, and third party 
management. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables in our analysis.  
Cluster Analysis 
Table 2 provides the correlations between security practices. Although several practices were highly correlated 
within the different domains (i.e., safeguarding information, auditing, HR management, and third party 
management), the security practices each have specific data protection features. Thus, we retained all 17 practices 
for cluster analysis. 
 
                                                           
† Kroll is a leader in healthcare data security and has helped some of the largest healthcare providers in the country respond to data security 
breaches. The survey was conducted in partnership with HIMSS (Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society), the leading 
organization representing the health information management systems and services industry. 
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Variable Name  Description (dichotomous indicators unless noted) Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Safeguarding Information     
IT Sec 
Technical IT Security Measures (i.e. firewalls, encrypted 
e-mails, network monitoring, intrusion detection etc.) 
0.98 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Report Breaches 
Process in Place for Reporting Breaches In Patient 
Information 
0.97 0.17 0.00 1.00 
Data Access 
Data Access Minimization (i.e. giving employees only 
the information they need) 
0.94 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Who They Say They Are Ensuring that Patient Is Who They Say They Are 0.91 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Access & Sharing Policies 
Specific Policy in place to Monitor Electronic Patient 
Health Information Access and Sharing 
0.87 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Auditing     
IT Audit  
IT Applications Have Audit Functions that monitor the 
access and use of patient information 
0.95 0.22 0.00 1.00 
Audit Systems 
Regular Audits Are Conducted of Systems That 
Generate/Collect/Transmit Patient Data 
0.87 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Audit IT logs 
IT Audit Logs Are Created and Analyzed For 
Inappropriate Access to Patient Data 
0.83 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Audit policies 
Regular Scheduled Meetings Are Conducted To Review 
Status of Data Security Policies 
0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Audit shared data 
Regular Audits Are Conducted For Processes Where 
Patient Info is Shared with External Orgs 
0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 
HR Management     
Hiring Practices Hiring Practices (i.e. background checks) 0.97 0.17 0.00 1.00 
HR monitor 
Human Resources monitors completion of courses on 
confidential patient data for hiring and continuing 
education tasks 
0.88 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Education Formal Education Courses 0.86 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Third Party Management     
Third-party Agreement Business Associate Agreement Signed by third-party 0.98 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Report third-party breaches  Proof of Employee Training 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Detect third-party breaches  
Ensure that third-party Has Plan for Notifying Covered 
Entities of Breach 
0.76 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Third-party Training Ensure that third-party Has Plan for Identifying Breaches 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Compliance  (1 - “not at all compliant”, 7 - “compliant with all applicable standards)      
HITECH HITECH 5.75 1.39 1.00 7.00 
Red Red flags Rule 6.14 1.21 1.00 7.00 
HIPAA HIPAA 6.59 0.70 2.00 7.00 
State State Security Laws 6.38 0.97 1.00 7.00 
CMS CMS Regulations 6.61 0.65 4.00 7.00 
Organizational Information (Control Variables)     
Size Size (1 - 100, 2 - 100 to 299, 3 - 300+ beds) 1.63 0.71 1.00 3.00 
Critical Access Critical Access 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
General Med General Med/Surg 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Academic Academic 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
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 1) IT Sec 1                                    
2) Report Breaches -0.02 1                                  
3) Data Access 0.27 -0.04 1                                
4) Who They Say 
They Are 
0.08 0.25 0.07 1                              
5) Access & 
Sharing Policies 








6) IT Audit  0.13 -0.04 0.33 0.01 0.39 1                          
7) Audit Systems 0.05 0.28 0.22 0.24 0.34 0.19 1                        
8) Audit IT logs 0.13 0.16 0.06 0.19 0.22 0.26 0.38 1                      
9) Audit policies 0.01 0.25 0.01 0.28 0.21 -0.07 0.31 0.19 1                    
10) Audit shared 
data 




11) Hiring Practices -0.02 -0.03 0.08 -0.05 0.02 0.09 -0.07 0.08 -0.03 -0.04 1                
12) HR monitor -0.05 0.21 -0.03 0.15 0.00 -0.08 0.18 0.04 0.16 0.16 0.21 1              












-0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 0.09 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 0.04 1          
15)Report third-
party breaches  
0.02 0.2 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.27 -0.02 0.12 0.14 0.19 1        
16)Detect third-
party breaches  
0 0.17 0.15 0.03 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.26 0.29 0.04 0.12 0.07 0.17 0.74 1      
17)Third-party 
Training 











18) HITECH 0.00 0.11 0.16 0.06 0.20 0.16 0.23 0.16 0.25 0.15 0.23 0.28 -0.01 -0.03 0.31 0.35 0.32 1    
19) RED -0.07 0.21 0.15 0.17 0.09 0.03 0.14 0.10 0.25 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.45 1   
20) HIPAA 0.02 0.15 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.16 0.20 0.15 0.22 0.18 0.16 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.27 0.23 0.26 0.44 0.29 1  
21) State 0.06 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.20 0.22 0.26 0.16 0.26 0.08 0.01 -0.02 0.24 0.26 0.33 0.39 0.34 0.57 1 
22) CMS 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.22 0.11 0.13 0.22 0.36 0.28 0.25 0.15 -0.06 0.02 0.21 0.24 0.30 0.45 0.35 0.45 0.55 
 
  Note. Values in bold represent statistically significant p value at 0.05 
Table 2 Correlations among Security Practices and Regulatory Compliance 
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Figure 1 Security Management Clusters (average practice adoption for each cluster) 
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To derive distinct and meaningful configurations from the security practices, we employed cluster analysis using 
distance measures based on response pattern similarity. In various contexts, such as psychological testing and 
marketing, cluster analysis has been found to be a useful means for exploring datasets and identifying underlying 
groups among individuals (Ravichandran and Rai 1999; Ferratt et al. 2005). In this study, we employed cluster 
analysis to examine groups of association among security practices. We employed Ward’s clustering algorithm 
(minimum-variance method), which calculates distance between hospitals using dichotomous data indicating the 
presence or absence of security practices.  
With the result from clustering, we then examined three statistical criteria in order to ensure the reliability of the 
appropriate number of clusters: cubic clustering criterion, pseudo-F, and pseudo-T2 (Milligan and Cooper 1985). 
Local peaks of the cubic clustering criterion and pseudo-F combined with a small value of the pseudo-T2 (11.6) led 
us to conclude that the most appropriate number of clusters was three. In addition, a large pseudo-T2 (189) of the 
next cluster solution (4) suggests that a good solution occurred immediately prior (3) (Institute 1990).  
We further tested the validity of the clusters using discriminant analysis, which is often used to verify the results of 
cluster analysis. The analysis runs the training data back through the minimum-variance method as a discriminant 
function to see how accurately they are classified. The results from our analysis indicated high levels of 
classification accuracy (95.88%, 80.52%, and 93.33% for clusters 1, 2, and 3, respectively). Appendix E provides 
details this analysis. 
RESULTS 
Clusters of Security Practices 
Through Ward’s clustering, three statistical criteria and discriminant analysis, we found that the hospitals’ security 
practice adoption patterns could be classified into three clusters. As shown in Table 3, cluster 1 are the security 
leaders, with the highest levels of security-practice adoption, cluster 2 are close followers with the second highest 
level, and cluster 3 are the laggers with the lowest level. The security leaders in cluster 1 and the close followers in 
cluster 2 consist primarily of general medical organizations, 60% and 57% respectively, followed by critical access 
and academic institutes. On the other hand, the laggers in cluster 3 consist of critical access (63%) and general 
medical organizations (33%), but no academic institutes. In terms of size, the laggers (1.33) are significantly smaller 
than the security leaders (1.67) and followers (1.69). This may imply that the laggers’ low adoption is attributed to 
the limited budgets of relatively small hospitals. 
Figure 1 visually describes the clusters using the mean values of the security practices provided in Table 3. It reveals 
interesting patterns of security practices. The security leaders in cluster 1 show high adoption across all practices 
while the others have big gaps. First, note that adoption of technical solutions for safeguarding information are not 
significantly different (from 0.93 to 0.99) among three clusters. IT audit applications also have smaller differences 
(0.80 to 0.99), with the notable exception of non-technical audit practices (from 0.13 to 1.00). However, the figure 
shows that there was wide variation in adoption of non-technical practices like policies and procedures. For instance, 
the adoption of accessing & sharing policies ranges from 0.53 to 0.94, and the adoption of shared data audits ranges 
from 0.13 to 0.90.   
Second, we can see that hospitals gave more weight to safeguarding information than to preforming regular audits. 
All three clusters have higher mean values for safeguarding (0.98, 0.94, and 0.77 for the security leaders, followers 
and laggers, respectively) than auditing (0.95, 0.85, and 0.41). Furthermore, the standard deviations for safeguarding 
information are smaller than for auditing (0.09, 0.22, and 0.39 vs. 0.18, 0.34, and 0.45). This indicates that the 
adoption of safeguarding practices have less differences among hospitals than those of audit practices (for all 
clusters). 
Third, in terms of HR management, most of hospitals have adopted one-off practices such as background checking 
in hiring (0.99, 0.96, and 0.93). On the other hand, their adoption of cultural practices such as continuous monitoring 
(0.96, 0.84, and 0.74) and employee education (0.97, 0.86, and 0.50) varies.  
Lastly, we see big differences between the three clusters for third-party management—the followers (cluster 2) and 
laggers (cluster 3) depended more on agreements signed by third parties than on implementing actual practices like 
third-party breach management or training. While 97% of the laggers had third-party agreements, only 20% had 
adopted third-party training programs and 40% had third-party breach management. On the other hand, 96% of the 
security leaders (cluster 1) had training programs and more than 99% had other third-party practices. 
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1-2 1-3 2-3 
     
Variable Name Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Difference 
Safeguarding Information          
IT Sec 0.99 0.10 0.99 0.11 0.93 0.25 0.00 0.06 0.06 
Report Breaches 1.00 0.00 0.99 0.11 0.83 0.38 0.01 0.17** 0.16** 
Data Access 1.00 0.00 0.91 0.29 0.83 0.38 0.09** 0.17** 0.08 
Who They Say They Are 0.99 0.10 0.88 0.32 0.73 0.45 0.11** 0.26*** 0.15* 
Access & Sharing Policies 0.94 0.24 0.92 0.27 0.53 0.51 0.02 0.41*** 0.39*** 
Domain Mean 0.98 0.09 0.94 0.22 0.77 0.39 0.05 0.21 0.17 
Auditing          
IT Audit  0.99 0.10 0.96 0.19 0.80 0.41 0.03 0.19** 0.16** 
Audit Systems 1.00 0.00 0.91 0.29 0.37 0.49 0.09** 0.63*** 0.54*** 
Audit IT logs 0.96 0.20 0.84 0.37 0.40 0.50 0.12** 0.56*** 0.44*** 
Audit policies 0.90 0.31 0.77 0.43 0.37 0.49 0.13** 0.53*** 0.4*** 
Audit shared data 0.90 0.31 0.77 0.43 0.13 0.35 0.13** 0.77*** 0.64*** 
Domain Mean 0.95 0.18 0.85 0.34 0.41 0.45 0.10 0.54 0.44 
HR Management          
Hiring Practices 0.99 0.10 0.96 0.19 0.93 0.25 0.03 0.06 0.03 
HR monitor 0.96 0.20 0.84 0.37 0.73 0.45 0.12** 0.23** 0.11 
Education 0.97 0.17 0.86 0.35 0.50 0.51 0.11** 0.47*** 0.36** 
Domain Mean 0.97 0.16 0.89 0.30 0.72 0.40 0.09 0.25 0.17 
Third Party Management          
Third-party Agreement 1.00 0.00 0.96 0.19 0.97 0.18 0.04 0.03 -0.01 
Report third-party breaches  1.00 0.00 0.69 0.47 0.40 0.50 0.31*** 0.60*** 0.29** 
Detect third-party breaches  0.99 0.10 0.61 0.49 0.40 0.50 0.38*** 0.59*** 0.21* 
Third-party Training 0.96 0.20 0.32 0.47 0.20 0.41 0.64*** 0.76*** 0.12 
Domain Mean 0.99 0.08 0.65 0.41 0.49 0.40 0.34 0.50 0.15 
Grand Mean 0.97 0.13 0.83 0.31 0.59 0.41 0.14 0.37 0.23 
Compliance          
HITECH 6.35 1.07 5.38 1.31 4.73 1.60 0.97*** 1.62*** 0.65** 
Red 6.59 0.75 5.74 1.45 5.73 1.23 0.85*** 0.86*** 0.01 
HIPAA 6.77 0.47 6.52 0.79 6.17 0.87 0.25** 0.6*** 0.35 
State 6.71 0.59 6.25 1.00 5.67 1.37 0.46*** 1.04*** 0.58** 
CMS 6.85 0.39 6.53 0.66 6.03 0.89 0.32*** 0.82*** 0.5** 
 6.65 0.65 6.08 1.04 5.67 1.19 0.57 0.99 0.42 
Organizational Information 
Size 1.67 0.69 1.69 0.75 1.33 0.61 -0.02 0.34** 0.36** 
Critical Access 0.29 0.46 0.32 0.47 0.63 0.49 -0.03 -0.34*** -0.31** 
General Med 0.60 0.49 0.57 0.50 0.33 0.48 0.03 0.27** 0.24** 
Academic 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.04** 0.05** 
Notes. p-values are represented by * Significant at p <0.1, ** Significant at p<0.05, *** Significant at p <0.01. Values in bold represent the 
average values of each domain. 
Table 3 Clustering Security Practices 
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Security Practices and Regulatory Compliance 
We further investigated (with t-tests) the relationship between the three clusters and perceived regulatory 
compliance. The comparisons allowed us to test how the adoption levels of security practices are associated with 
perceived regulatory compliance. Figure 2 describes the relationships between three clusters’ practice adoption and 
regulatory compliance for each of the four security domains. The graphs indicate that the effects of security 
practices are not uniform across the clusters as well as the security domains. First, the adoption levels within 
safeguarding (0.77 to 0.98) and HR practices (0.72 to 0.97) are not significantly distinguished among the security 
leaders, followers and laggers (see Table 3). This indicates that the followers and laggers already reached solid 
adoption levels within these domains.  
On the other hand, the adoption levels within auditing (0.41 to 0.95) and third party practices (0.49 to 0.99) are 
widely dispersed across the three clusters. While the auditing distance between the security leaders in cluster 1 and 
the followers in cluster 2 is close, the laggers in cluster 3 significantly fell below the followers as shown in Table 3. 
In particular, regular audit policies and procedures have significantly larger differences than IT audit application. 
That implies that the laggers should focus their efforts on developing auditing policies and procedures. Lastly, the 
followers were less likely to adopt third-party practices than the security leaders (although their adoption levels were 
a little higher than those of the laggers). Note that regulatory compliance (HITECH, HIPAA, and State) and third 
party management (breach practices and training) are significantly correlated as Table 2 describes, whereas third-
party agreement shows very low correlation. Thus, we can conclude that third party breach management and training 
play a key role for perceived regulatory compliance (rather than third party agreements), and further those adoption 
levels differentiate the security leaders from the others. 
  
  
Note. Compliance measured on a seven-point scale where 1 -“not at all compliant” and 7 -“compliant with all applicable standards 
Figure 2 The Relationships Between Security Practices and Regulatory Compliance 
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DISCUSSION 
We draw several implications from the findings. First, our results showed that hospitals try to balance practice 
adoption within the four security domains. For example, the laggers in cluster 3 had widely adopted at least one 
security practice from each domain (i.e., third-party agreement (0.97), technical IT safeguarding measures (0.93), 
hiring practices (0.93), and IT audit applications (0.80)). These four practices are ranked first through forth within 
cluster 3, and further the adoption levels of the first three practices are not significantly different than those of the 
security leaders in cluster 1. The followers in cluster 2 showed higher levels for practices that were very low for the 
laggers, while maintaining the laggers’ top four practices. Lastly, the security leaders in cluster 1 had highly adopted 
all security practices in a balanced way. This seems to indicate that hospitals tried first to ensure information 
security in major security domains by adopting at least one practice, rather than comprehensively adopting practices 
within any single domain. This may indicate that the current regulatory environment pushes hospitals towards a 
“cover the bases” approach rather than deep adoption within any particular security domain. 
Second, hospitals likely put highest priority on adopting technical solutions (i.e., firewalls, encrypted e-mails, 
network monitoring, intrusion detection etc.) rather than security management processes. Similarly, in terms of 
auditing, they more frequently adopted IT applications to support audit functions than developing audit procedures. 
Despite the hospitals’ high adoption of technical solutions, their reported compliance levels varied. This compliance 
variation seems to be associated with the adoption levels of policies and procedures, suggesting that deploying non-
technical solutions with technical solutions is important for improved regulatory compliance. 
Third, hospitals with lower compliance preferred one-time practices like hiring practices (e.g., background 
checking) or third-party agreements to cultural practices like education or developing security procedures. 
Improving cultural practices would be more difficult, since it requires all employees and organization partners to be 
involved in developing a mature security culture. As shown in Table 2, the level of regulatory compliance is more 
closely associated with cultural practices than one-time third-party agreements. 
Lastly, security practices have different effects on compliance levels. Our results indicate that the laggers in cluster 3 
should focus on auditing solutions, while the followers need to better manage third-party breaches and training.  
Regarding the levels of hospitals’ compliance and security practices adoption, policy makers should provide 
guidelines that balance adoption between technical and non-technical solutions and between one-time vs. cultural 
tasks.  
Limitations 
Although this study sheds light on the security practices and compliance, it is important to acknowledge the 
limitations. The survey data was self-reported by IT managers including IT executives, Chief Security Officers 
(CSO), Health Information Management (HIM) Directors, Compliance Officers and Privacy Officers in each 
participating organization. Therefore, our results are based on managerial perceptions of security practices and 
regulatory compliance. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We examined the adoption of security practices, with the goal of identifying dominant configurations, and their 
relationship to perceived compliance. Using survey data that provided the status of adopted security practices, we 
clustered 204 hospitals into three groups. Clusters were based on practice similarities and associated compliance 
levels. While hospitals across all three clusters widely adopted technical practices, we found significant differences 
among non-technical practices. Further, we demonstrated that audit practices play a critical role in the improved 
compliance we observed in the followers, while third-party breach management and training were important to reach 
the highest levels of compliance found among the leaders in cluster 1.  
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